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Over the last two decades a growing interest in understanding what determines the 
redistributive role of tax-benefit systems has emerged worldwide. In the case of Italy, 
previous analyses were mainly focused on quantifying the contribution of marginal tax 
rates, deductions and tax credits to the redistributive capacity of personal income tax 
(PIT), while neglecting the effect on income redistribution of proportional taxes and 
income sources exempt from taxation such as tax-free cash benefits. This paper aims 
to fill this gap by applying two alternative Gini-based decomposition methodologies 
(Onrubia et al., 2014; Urban, 2014) to the redistributive effects of the Italian tax-
benefit system over the period 2005-2018. The contribution of each tax-benefit 
instrument is quantified for several scenarios which diverge from each other in that 
they are representative of different degrees of extension of the tax-benefit system under 
examination. 
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In recent years, the study of tax redistribution has been revived thanks to the increasing 
availability of exhaustive and comparable data sets at the micro level. This wealth of 
information has led to remarkable advances in static microsimulation modelling 
(Orcutt, 1957; O’Donoughe, 2014). Besides the development of the state-of-the-art tax-
benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD (Surtherland and Figari, 2013), that is a 
powerful tool in terms of cross-country comparability, a variety of national models have 
flourished in a number of European countries.1 A wide range of questions concerning 
income inequality measurements can now be addressed by social scientists in a 
comparative perspective both spatial and temporal. In this paper, microsimulation 
techniques provide the starting point for studying the effect of taxes and benefits on 
income redistribution.     
When estimating the equalising effect of a tax-benefit system over different time 
periods, a careful analysis of the nature of the effects is necessary. A higher or lower 
level of income inequality can be the result of policy changes in the tax-benefit system 
under examination, as well as of changes not directly related to the structure of the 
tax-benefit system, such as differences in market income distribution or demographic 
characteristics (Bargain and Callan, 2010). Following this framework, it is possible to 
isolate the contribution of overall policy changes on income inequality levels from all 
other effects over time. But what do we know about the role played by each tax-benefit 
instrument in shaping redistribution? What tools most affect redistribution when 
focusing merely on PIT? At a broader level, do proportional taxes and tax-free cash 
benefits play a progressive effect on income inequality? 
Despite the lack of homogeneity with which they have been addressed in terms of 
the methodological approaches adopted, these questions have attracted a growing 
attention all over the world over the past two decades (Creedy and Van de Ven, 2002; 
Immervoll et al., 2005; Urban, 2008; Kristjánsson, 2011; Verbist and Figari, 2013; 
Hümbelin and Farys, 2018; Morger and Schaltegger, 2018; Guilland et al., 2019). With 
regard to Italy, whose tax-benefit system is the object of this study, a wealth of evidence 
has been provided above all on the relative effect of PIT components. One of the earliest 
contribution to the field was Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2001), showing that 
progressivity of both gross and net tax liabilities were mainly due to rate and tax credit 
effects at the tax unit level during the mid-late 1980s. Moving to more recent research, 
and still keeping the individual as the unit of analysis, the contribution given by tax 
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credits and marginal tax rates was estimated to be 61.2% and 40.3% respectively of 
the net redistributive power of PIT by Di Caro (2018) using individual tax returns for 
the 2014 tax year, whilst deductions produced a much smaller positive effect (1.3%). 
Similar results were obtained by Barbetta et al. (2018) analysing a sample of tax reports 
for the 2011 tax year and with studies based on sample survey data both at the 
individual and household level (Boscolo, 2019).   
Taking a broader view, Fuest et al. (2010) analysed the redistributive effect of tax-
benefit systems in the enlarged EU by applying two decomposition approaches to the 
2007 EU-SILC wave at the household level, namely the sequential accounting approach 
(SA) and the factor source decomposition approach (FSD), both implemented on the 
basis of the generalised entropy class of inequality indices (Shorrocks, 1980). In 
particular, Fuest et al. showed how the application of each method had contradictory 
policy implications. In relation to the Italian tax-benefit system, the authors suggested 
a predominant effect of public pensions and PIT in determining redistribution (38.3% 
and 25.0% respectively), accompanied by a small equalising effect of cash benefits 
(4.3%) and a negative impact of social insurance contributions (-3.0%) when using SA. 
With FSD, in contrast with the just mentioned evidence, the redistributive role played 
by public pensions was found to be negative (-15.3%) and the same for cash benefits (-
1.5%), while PIT and social insurance contributions showed an equalising effect on 
income inequality (46.8% and 16.9% respectively). Fuest et al., while shedding light on 
the contribution of a number of tax-benefit instruments, focused on aggregate income 
variables such as the total sum of cash benefits rather than the total amount of state 
pensions paid. 
To the best of our knowledge, no research has yet explored the contribution of 
proportional taxes and tax-free cash benefits to the redistributive effect of the Italian 
tax-benefit system at the level of specific measures. The aim of this paper is to fill this 
gap by applying two alternative Gini-based decomposition methodologies proposed in 
the literature (Onrubia et al., 2014; Urban, 2014) with different degrees of extension of 
the tax-benefit system under examination, referred to as scenarios. Each scenario was 
simulated by using the EUROMOD microsimulation model for the 2005 and 2018 tax 
year. This timeframe will allow us to investigate the differences in the redistributive 
power of each tax-benefit measure in light of the substantial legislative changes taking 
place in the time span chosen.  
The study of how tax-benefit systems redistribute resources appears to be crucial in 
the Italian context considering the recent changes in the tax regime for the self-
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employed (MEF, 2019) and the proposal2 to phase in a flat tax scheme on personal 
income as the goal of the tax policy agenda of the current Parliament (Baldini and 
Rizzo, 2019b). Such a reform in Italy would have a significant effect: an increase in 
income inequality associated with a decrease in both progressivity and average tax rate 
effect, due to revenue losses of up to 50 billion euros in the most radical proposal 
(Baldini and Rizzo, 2019a). Since ‘the tax system shall be progressive’ as stated in 
Article 53 of the Italian Constitution, the importance of understanding the role played 
by progressive taxation in the redistribution of income acquires a renewed interest in 
light of a tax reform on personal income characterised by regressive redistributive 
consequences. In addition, it is necessary to bear in mind that VAT continues to be 
highly regressive with regard to the bottom income groups (Gastaldi et al., 2017). At 
the same time, the ongoing process of gradual erosion of the PIT base as a result of 
the subjection of certain income components to proportional taxation (Boscolo, 2019), 
often put forward as one of the justifications for the introduction of a flat tax scheme 
due to the loss of vertical and horizontal equity (Stevanato, 2016; Rossi, 2018), is 
important in this connection.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and methodological 
approach, focusing above all on the scenarios simulated and on the decomposition 
formulas employed in order to determine the relative contribution of each tax-benefit 
instrument. Section 3 presents the results of the analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Data and methodological approach 
 
As noted above, the analysis was carried out using the EUROMOD model for the two 
years considered. The data employed are the best-match data sets available for running 
the microsimulation model: the 2006 and 2016 European Union Statistics on Income 
and Living Condition (EU-SILC) for the simulation of the 2005 and 2018 tax years 
respectively. All scenarios discussed here were simulated by taking the household as 
the unit of analysis, made equivalent by means of the OECD modified scale.  
An overview of the scenarios involved is presented in Table 1. Starting from Scenario 
1, in this case the definition of gross income is given by the sum of all gross income 
components subject to PIT and regional surtax. Results from this first scenario are of 
interest for two reasons: on the one hand, given the availability of fully comparable 
studies based on administrative data (Barbetta, Pellegrino and Turati 2018; Di Caro 
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2018), they facilitate the macroeconomic validation of the model in terms of 
redistributive indices; on the other hand, substantial changes in the structure of PIT 
occurred during the period 2005-2018. Scenario 2 adds to the previous income definition 
all those income sources taxed at a proportional tax rate such as capital income and 
rental income from residential properties. The definition used in Scenario 3 adds to the 
sum of all income sources included in the previous two scenarios income sources exempt 
from taxation, mainly consisting of cash benefits, regardless of their non-means- or 
means-tested nature. Last but not least, Scenario 4 takes into account social insurance 
contributions from all sources (employee/self-employed as well as employer 
contributions).  
 
Table 1. Description of the scenarios simulated 
     
VARIABLE Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
     
     
Gross income subject to progressive taxation before SICs    ✔ 
Gross income subject to progressive taxation after SICs ✔ ✔ ✔  
Gross income subject to proportional taxes   ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Tax-free cash non-means- and means-tested benefits   ✔ ✔ 
Other income sources exempt from taxation   ✔ ✔ 
     
 
2.1 Gini-based decomposition formulas 
 
The decomposition formulas of the net/gross redistributive effect applied in this study 
are discussed below. The computation of the contribution given by each tax-benefit 
instrument is first carried out by applying the generalisation of the Pfähler–Lambert 
decomposition outlined by Onrubia et al. (2014) (hereinafter O14). This method makes 
it possible to associate with each tool available to the government a single effect on the 
gross redistributive capacity of the tax-benefit system as measured by the Reynolds-
Smolensky index (hereinafter RS index), overcoming the need for a sequential order 
when measuring the contribution of tax expenditures.  
Following the order of the terms of the right-hand side in (1), the RS index can be 
broken down into three main aggregates: i) the sum of tax schedules; ii) the sum of tax 
credits; iii) the sum of exemptions, allowances and tax deductions. Each aggregate is 
given by the sum of its subcomponents, while each subcomponent is given by the 
product of the group weight, constant for all subcomponents of a specific aggregate, 
the individual weight and the Kakwani index (hereinafter K index). Y is the gross 
income, that is the sum of all income sources subject to (or exempt from) progressive 
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taxation according to the scenario; B is the total taxable income, given by the sum of 
taxable income components subject to PIT or substitute taxes; S stands for total gross 
liability; T is total net liability;  indicates the i-th tax schedule;  is the i-th tax 
credit; finally,  represents the i-th exemption, allowance or deduction of the tax 
system. The upper bar means that the variable is at its average value.   
It is evident that tax-free cash benefits can be thought of as exemptions, an 
interpretation which is strengthened by the fact that several non-means-tested benefits 
are currently subject to progressive marginal tax rates (e.g. unemployment benefits). 
To simplify matters, taking only the first term on the right-hand side, the group weight 
is given by the ̅̅̅̅/( ̅ −  ̅); the individual weight is the proportion between the i-th 
tax schedule and total taxable income; , − − ,  is the difference between the 
concentration indices of taxable income and taxable income minus the i-th tax schedule 
respectively, both sorted by non-decreasing values of gross income – which we earlier 
defined as the Kakwani index. The same logic is then applied to the remaining terms 
in (1).  
 





(, − − , ) − 
̅





( −, −  −−, )





(  −  −!, )                                                   (1) 
 
The method proposed by O14 has recently received considerable attention in the Italian 
literature (Di Caro, 2017 and 2018; Barbetta et al., 2018; Boscolo, 2019). The desirable 
characteristic of allowing the decomposition on the common tax base of overall gross 
income, namely the sum of all mutually exclusive tax bases of a tax system, is 
important due to the policy implications that can be derived from its application.3 
The decomposition formula presented in (1) is adopted to break down the RS index, 
capturing the reduction in inequality due to monetary transfers from better-off to 
worse-off income groups. Our interest is also extended to the horizontal effect as 
identified by the reranking term, R, to obtain a measure of the net redistributive effect 
of the tax-benefit system (hereinafter RE). This computation is carried out by using 
the non-unique method of estimation proposed in Duclos (1993) (hereinafter D93), 
making it possible to separate the part of the reranking effect due to net tax liabilities, 
, from that due to tax-free income sources broadly defined (almost all cash benefits), 
. In breaking down the reranking term, we assume that net tax liabilities come 
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first, rather than cash benefits. The reranking decomposition discussed in (2) is applied 
according to the scenario under examination. 
 
 = # + % = ( −#, −#−% −  −#, ) + (  −# −  −#, −#−%)     (2)  
 
One requirement that needs to be met in order to obtain a proper decomposition of the 
vertical effect as described in (1) is to define total taxable income or total gross income 
as the sum of mutually exclusive components. In order to explain why this is needed, 
take the case of social insurance contributions (hereinafter SICs). These are levied on 
gross income, whereas gross income after SICs is subject to PIT. When adopting the 
method in (1), a problem arises in defining the common tax base. In the Italian tax-
benefit system, self-employed SICs are deducted from gross income from employment 
after SICs subject to PIT to obtain taxable income. This would lead to an unjustified 
reduction of the common tax base since self-employed SICs are first included in taxable 
income and then deducted from it. In other words, the sum of the relative effects is 
equal to the redistributive effect of the corresponding tax system only if  =  + , 
according to the notation in (1). In order to satisfy this condition, a lower value of 
total taxable income than the actual one would be needed. Consequently, the results 
of the decomposition are likely to be biased by the remarkable amount of self-employed 
SICs granted in the form of deduction, amounting to 19.6 billion euros for the 2017 tax 
year according to aggregate tax returns. The lack of mutual exclusion between income 
sources therefore tends to distort the contribution of the measures analysed.  
To deal with these issues, the decomposition method proposed by Urban (2014) 
(hereinafter U14) seems to be particularly useful. Based on the earlier contributions of 
Kakwani (1984) and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), it offers a reliable approach to 
studying the contribution of taxes and benefits to marginal changes in vertical and 
horizontal effects of a tax-benefit system. Its analytical power makes it a useful tool 
for policy and decision-making process, since it provides an empirical framework to 
isolate the determinants of marginal changes in the net redistributive effect of a tax-
benefit system conditional on the actual redistributive capacity of such a system. Unlike 
the previous method, it does not require compliance with the mutual exclusion 
property. Imposing proportional changes in pre-tax/benefit income, total taxes and 
total benefits for all income units,4 a single figure is computed for each tax-benefit 
instrument for the change in both the vertical and horizontal effect. Based on the 
notation in (1)-(2), an extended formalisation of the method is given below:  
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where δ indicates that we are now breaking down the change into vertical and 
horizontal effects; 	 is the i-th income source exempt from progressive taxation; 
 
stands for the proportional change imposed and it is embedded within the methodology 
when an upper dot lies above the terms. In line with O14, it should be noted that the 
decomposition formulas just presented rely on the prevalent normative view on vertical 
equity, requiring a non-decreasing level of taxes minus benefits for non-decreasing 
values of pre-fiscal income in relative rather than absolute terms, as assumed in the 







3. Data analysis 
 
Before moving on to the discussion of the application of the Gini-based decomposition 
approaches, some general results may be presented concerning the comparative analysis 
within a given timeframe. This may be useful in order to better understand the context 
in which the analysis of the relative contribution of tax-benefit instruments takes place.  
 
Figure 1. Income composition of equavalised gross household income by decile 
 
 
It is important to specify how income components of disposable income were 
distributed and what changes occurred in the period 2005-2018. Figure 1 is intended 
to provide an answer by breaking down disposable income per decile of equivalised 
gross household income into six components based on the different tax regimes in force 
for both years. In terms of disposable income a greater weight is now attributed to 
income sources exempt from tax, above all for the bottom two income groups: their 
incidence almost tripled during the time span observed for the worse-off decile, 
increasing from 14.7% to 41.9%, while the second lowest income group experienced a 
lower increase in relative terms since tax-free income sources doubled, increasing from 
7.2% to 15.1%. Despite its limited incidence on disposable income, the proportion of 
gross income subject to proportional taxes changed over the period under examination 
from 5.4% to 8.0% when considering the population as a whole. By subtracting the 
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distribution, it is also possible to establish which income groups presented on average 
a positive net position, considered as the difference between what a household receives 
in the form of cash benefits and other tax-free income components minus total net 
liability. Only the poorest decile had a positive net position equal to 19.0% and 5.9% 
of disposable income in 2005 and 2018 respectively. The other groups along the income 
distribution presented a negative balance, generally becoming wider with increasing 
levels of gross income. However, income groups for the 2018 tax year contributed more 
in net terms than in 2005 except for the ninth and tenth deciles.   
 
Figure 2. Average tax rate for the 2005 and 2018 tax years by decile of equivalised gross 
household income in Scenario 4 
 
 
In addition to the slight changes in income composition over the period 2005-2018, 
it is important to consider how total tax burdens varied among income groups before 
moving on to the examination of further results. As shown in Figure 2, again taking 
deciles of equivalised gross household income as the basis for the calculation, the tax 
incidence curves of overall taxation in each period present a similar shape, moving 
upwards from the third decile. Tax burdens varied substantially in the left tail of the 
distribution over the period under examination, where the increased incidence of SICs 
on total gross income for the poorest 20% in 2018 results in an overall curve with a V-
shaped form. In addition, the lower incidence for 2018 among the low-medium and 
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Progressive taxation (05) Progressive taxation (18)
Proportional taxation (05) Proportional taxation (18)
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Overall taxation (05) Overall taxation (18)
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burden concentrated in the right tail of the distribution. The temporal comparison 
therefore suggests a further general result: middle income groups seem to have benefited 
most from the changes taking place in the tax curve over the period 2005-2018 at the 
expense of  households located in the tails of the income distribution, that in relative 
terms paid a higher amount of tax in 2018 than in 2005.   
The analysis now turns to the results of the application of the Gini-based 
decomposition approaches. Based on the notation adopted in Section 2, the net 
redistributive effect of a tax-benefit system can be divided into three components as 
follows (Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977):  
 
* =  −  = [ =1 − = (#, −   )] − (  −# −  −#, )             (11) 
 
where the first term between square brackets, =/1 − =, is the average tax rate effect 
related to the RS index, capturing the redistributive effect of a tax-benefit system 
without taking account of horizontal adjustments along the income distribution. The 
second term in square brackets is the K index and provides a measure of departure 
from proportionality of what is defined from time to time as total taxes according to 
the scenario under examination. Finally, the last term in round brackets stands for the 
reranking term, R. With these notations, changes in the net redistributive effect can 
be driven by substantial increases (decreases) in the average tax rate keeping constant 
the level of progressivity achieved by the tax-benefit system and vice versa. 
Table 2 shows the most widely used indices in measuring income redistribution for 
each scenario, once again taking the equivalent household as the unit of analysis. First, 
it is crucial to stress the fact that pre-tax Gini indices (  ) under Scenario 1 diverge 
substantially over time. Gross income subject to PIT for the 2018 tax year, 66.4% of 
which was given by the sum of income from employment and self-employment, is found 
to be less equally distributed than its counterpart for the year 2005: the difference in 
the Gini index is significant and almost equal to 0.05 points. Despite this remarkable 
difference, when repeating the calculation with a comprehensive definition of gross 
income as in Scenario 4, the 2018 tax-system still presents a higher level of income 
inequality, but this is lower than for the year 2005. The difference is now 0.026 points 
due to an increase of the 2005 pre-tax Gini index over the period of 2.5% and to a 2.7% 





Table 2. Redistributive indices in each scenario (indices multiplied by 100) 
     
INDEX 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
2005 2018 2005 2018 2005 2018 2005 2018 
         
         
  : pre-tax Gini index 36.73 41.41 37.25 41.35 35.94 38.75 37.65 40.30 
  −# : post-tax Gini index 32.14 36.61 32.85 36.89 31.43 34.01 31.43 34.01 
*: net redistributive effect 4.60 4.81 4.40 4.47 4.51 4.74 6.22 6.30 
# , : conc. index of taxes 57.04 61.00 56.40 59.32 56.19 58.98 51.55 53.85 
?: Kakwani index 20.31 19.59 19.15 17.97 20.25 20.23 13.90 13.55 
=: average tax rate 18.64 19.94 18.87 20.16 18.44 19.31 33.38 34.50 
=/(1 − =): average tax rate effect 22.91 24.91 23.26 25.25 22.61 23.95 50.11 52.67 
 −#, : conc. index of net income 32.09 36.54 32.80 36.82 31.36 33.91 30.68 33.17 
: reranking or horizontal effect 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.75 0.84 
: vertical effect  4.65 4.88 4.45 4.54 4.58 4.84 6.97 7.14 
         
 @A=: Gross income subject to PIT 100.0 100.0 95.5 93.3 93.1 89.3 76.2 72.5 
 %B14: PIT and surtax 101.3 101.5 100.9 96.2 93.1 80.1 -* -* 
 %)+ D13: PIT and surtax 100.0 100.0 94.8 94.4 73.4 61.5 43.2 40.2 
 %)*D13: PIT and surtax 100.0 100.0 94.6 93.9 79.0 67.7 56.7 52.2 
         
* No value is reported since the application of O14 for Scenario 4 would lead to biased results due to 
the lack of compliance with the mutual exclusion property as explained in Subsection 2.1. 
 
Second, still with regard to the comparison between the first and last of the 
scenarios, the redistributive power of the tax-benefit system is more than 30% higher 
in both years (∆*051−4 : 35.2% → ∆*181−4: 31.0%)5. As summarised by the post-
tax Gini index (), inequality in disposable income is higher for the 2018 tax year 
consistently with previous findings on pre-tax income inequality. Looking at the 
determinants of , the degree of progressivity of PIT declined slightly over the period 
under examination (?051: 0.2031 → ?181: 0.1959), while the average tax rate increased 
by 1.3% (=051: 18.64% → =181: 19.94%). The higher value of *181 in absolute terms 
should therefore be attributed to the predominance of the average tax rate effect over 
the progressivity effect. As expected, the average tax rate effect still plays the key role 
in determining the redistributive effect in Scenario 4 for both tax-benefit systems due 
to its remarkable increase (∆=051−4: 79.1% → ∆=181−4: 73.0%), an effect partially offset 
by a decrease in the departure from proportionality (∆?051−4: -31.6% → ∆?181−4: -
30.8%) and by a growing importance of the reranking term (054: 0.75 → 184: 0.84).  
When taking a wider view of Scenarios 2 and 3, it is first worth noting that 
progressivity diminishes as expected when including income sources subject to 
proportional taxation (∆?051−2: -5.7% → ∆?181−2: -8.3%), due to a decrease in the 
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net redistributive effect (∆*051−2 : -4.3% → ∆*181−2: -7.1%) which is not offset by 
the slightly increased average tax rate (∆=051−2 : 1.2% → ∆=181−2: 1.1%). Furthermore, 
SICs seem to play a crucial role in shaping the progressivity of the Italian tax-benefit 
system above all in 2005 since the level does not vary substantially from Scenario 1 to 
Scenario 3 (∆?051−3: -0.3%). As far as the 2018 tax year is concerned, the more 
pronounced positive effect of income sources exempt from taxation on progressivity 
(∆?052−3: 5.7% → ∆?182−3: 12.6%) seems to cointain the reduction of the latter 
under Scenario 4. 
As noted in the introduction, the ratio of gross income subject to PIT on total gross 
income (defined as GPit in Table 2) shows a decrease of 3.8% in Scenario 3 (3.7% in 
Scenario 4) over the period under examination, meaning that a higher fraction of 
income is now exempt from progressive taxation. But what seems even more interesting 
is the consequent reduction in the contribution of progressive taxation to the 
redistributive effect depending on the decomposition approach adopted. Supposing the 
absence of horizontal movements along the income distribution, PIT and regional 
surtax jointly considered amount to 80.1% of 183 and 61.5% of )+183 when employing 
O14 and U14 respectively. These contributions are both lower by more than 10% than 
the corresponding figures for the 2005 tax year (05B14,3: 93.1%; )+05D13,3: 73.4%). 
The contribution of progressive taxation to marginal changes in RE, in other words 
the sum of both vertical and horizontal changes, is then similarly reduced over the time 
period ()*05D13: 79.0% → )*18D13  : 67.7%). When including SICs in the computation 
as in Scenario 4, PIT and regional surtax amount to 40.2% of )+184 and 52.5% 
of )*184, in both cases lower than the results for the 2005 tax period ()+054: 43.3%; 
)*054: 56.7%). To state it clearly: in relative terms progressive taxation as defined by 
the 2018 Italian tax-benefit system now contributes less than 15 years ago to reducing 
income inequality according to the decomposition approaches adopted in this study. 
This reduced contribution to the redistributive effect does not warrant the claim that 
progressive taxation makes no difference in achieving redistributive goals, since it still 
plays a substantial role, regardless of the methodology adopted. However, the 
implication of the figures presented above is that progressive taxation would potentially 
contribute to a lower extent than its actual redistributive capacity (as computed by 
using O14) when enhancing redistribution via proportional changes for all income units. 
As a result, its reduced influence conditional on the existing composition of the tax-
benefit system suggests that a significant role in determining redistribution can also be 




3.1 The relative contribution of tax-benefit instruments applying Onrubia 
et al. (2014)  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, progressive taxation underwent major changes over 
the period chosen. The most important change goes back to the provisions of the 2007 
Finance Act, (Ceriani and Gigliarano, 2010): the ‘no-tax-area and progressivity’ 
allowance (1), graduated on the basis of the type of income earned, and tax allowances 
for dependent family members (2) were replaced with a system of similar tax credits; 
the number of PIT brackets increased from four to five and the consequent change of 
the tax rate applied.6 As a result, what determines the redistribution of PIT has 
changed remarkably. The role played by marginal tax rates amounted to 18.7% of RS 
for the 2005 tax-benefit system, obtained as the sum of gross PIT (1,051 : 21.1%) and 
the regional surtax (2,051 : -2.4%). What remains of RE was entirely achieved by 
deductions with a contribution of 83.7%, where the replaced deductions  and  
accounted for 66.7% and 18.7% respectively. Tax credits were found to have a minor 
regressive effect of -1.1%. This distribution of effects was instead inverted for the 2018 
tax-benefit system. Deductions no longer played a dominant role following the 
legislative changes: their effect may be quantified as 4.2% of the gross redistributive 
effect. The most important role is now played by tax credits with a contribution of 
55.0% consisting of the tax credit which replaced the ‘no-tax-area and progressivity’ 
allowance (5,181 : 40.5%) and the pool of tax credits which replaced tax allowances for 
dependent family members (6,181 : 8.4%; 7,181 : 2.9%; 9,181 : 0.2%). Last but not least, 
in relative terms the impact of PIT tax rates on redistribution doubled to 39.3%, 
followed by a smaller progressive effect of the regional surtax (2,181 : 3.2%)7. These 
findings show that tax expenditures by income source either in the form of deductions 
(1) or tax credits (5) are still the tools which for the most part determine PIT 
redistribution, a result which reflects the high ratio of taxpayers mainly with 
employment or retirement income (83.3% in 2017, the most recent year available at 
the time of writing).8 Relative contributions calculated for the year 2018 are in line 
with previous studies using administrative data (Barbetta et al., 2018; Di Caro, 2018).  
Focusing on the results in Scenario 3 (full results reported in Appendix), it may be 
seen that almost no tax-benefit instrument exercises a regressive effect on income 
distribution except for the proportional tax on deposits (8) for both tax periods. 
Withholding taxes on capital income and gains, broadly defined as the sum of arrears 
and severance pay (3), government bonds (6) and others (4), dividends (5), private 
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pensions (7) and deposits, contribute positively albeit to a small extent to determining 
RE, which is equal to 0.4% and 1.9% for the 2005 and 2018 tax years respectively. A 
growing and significant role is instead played by disability pensions9 (10,053 : 2.0% → 
10,183 : 5.5%) and social pension (8,053 : 3.3% → 8,183 : 4.9% ). Family allowances, 
known in the Italian system as Assegno per il nucleo familiare, have a stable positive 
effect over the period studied (9,053 : 2.8% → 9,183 : 2.9%).  
 
Table 3. RE decomposition in Scenario 3 applying O14 (unit of 





   
   
PIT (1) 95.3 77.6 
Regional surtax (2) -2.2 2.5 
Proportional taxes on capital income (3-8) 0.4 1.9 
Proportional tax on rental income (9) - 2.9 
   
Social pension (8) 3.3 4.8 
Family allowances (9) 2.9 2.9 
Disability pensions (10) 2.0 5.5 
Housing benefits (11) 0.2 0.2 
Minimum Insertion Income (12) 0.2 0.2 
Child benefits (13) 0.0 0.2 
Maternity payments (14) 0.0 0.2 
Scholarships and grants (15) 0.0 0.0 
Non-taxable rental income (16) -0.4 0.0 
REI (17) - 1.3 
80 euro bonus (18) - 1.3 
Newborn bonus (19) - 0.6 
Maternity bonus (20) - 0.0 
   
   
Reranking (R) 1.6 2.1 
   
   
Redistributive effect (RE) 100.0 100.0 
   
Note: values are ordered by increasing contributions of the 2005 tax 
period. 
 
A number of new tax-benefit instruments were introduced over the period 2005-
2018. Rental income from residential property is now excluded from the PIT base and 
taxed at a proportional tax rate of 10% when the underlying contract was stipulated 
at a controlled rent and 21% for all remaining cases. This optional tax regime, 
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introduced under the name of cedolare secca in 2011, is intended to recover tax revenue 
and to favour the emersion of undeclared properties. In the first year of its introduction, 
revenue collected amounted to 0.9 billion euros for a total of nearly half a million 
taxpayers according to tax returns. The popularity of the alternative measure to 
progressive taxation increased rapidly in subsequent years, with revenues amounting 
to 2.6 billion paid by 2.4 million taxpayers for the tax year 2017. It is still not clear 
whether the exclusion from PIT of this source of income has effectively encouraged 
property owners to declare unregistered properties, thus increasing tax revenues. This 
is because of another tax change concerning rental income still subject at the discretion 
of the taxpayer to progressive marginal tax rates: while taxable income was determined 
taking into account 85% of the value of the rental income until 2013, the proportion is 
now 95% (Beraldo and Esposito, 2019). Due to the high concentration in the wealthiest 
income groups (9,18 : 0.56), the effect of cedolare secca on income inequality is found 
to be positive and equal to 2.9%.  
During the seventeenth legislature of the Italian Republic – under the Renzi 
government  – four measures were introduced in the broad context of redistributive 
policies: a) the ‘80 euro’ bonus (18)10, an in-work refundable tax credit of 80 euros per 
month granted to employees with income from employment ranging from 8,174 to 
26,600 euros and positive net PIT, meant to stimulate private consumption of the 
working class and to boost economic growth (Baldini et al., 2015b; Bazzoli et al., 2017); 
the total amount was 11.7 billion euros for 9.5 million earners according to 
administrative data for 2017; b) the newborn bonus (19), a means-tested benefit of 
960 euros per year aiming to tackle child poverty and to increase the purchasing power 
of medium-low income groups, that can be claimed by households for each newborn or 
adopted child during the tax period in question if the corresponding ISEE (Indicatore 
della Situazione Economica Equivalente, a means-testing criterion also taking account 
of the overall wealth of the household) is less than 25,000 euros, while the amount of 
the bonus is doubled if the ISEE household income is less than 7,000 euros; EUROMOD 
calculations for the 2018 tax-benefit system indicate that roughly 900,000 households 
benefited from the bonus for a total amount of 1.1 billion euros; c) the Italian minimum 
income benefit for the year 2018, better known as REI – Reddito di Inclusione (17), 
the first universal tool to fight absolute poverty ever introduced in the history of the 
Italian welfare state (Baldini et al., 2018), consisted of a cash benefit of a maximum of 
6,408 euros per year conditional on the fulfilment of several economic criteria and the 
activation of a personalised path of social and labour re-inclusion of the family;10 based 
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on EUROMOD, its aggregate value amounted to 1.1 billion euros for a total of 800,000 
households; last, d) the maternity bonus (20), a lump sum benefit of 800 euros paid 
for the birth or adoption of a child regardless of the economic condition of the applicant; 
nearly half a million households received this benefit in 2018 for an aggregate value of 
485 million euros. These redistributive policies amounted to 14.4 billion euros in total, 
equal to 0.8% of GDP at market prices in 2018. The adoption of O14 makes it possible 
to quantify the gross redistributive effect of all four measures as 3.2%, showing a 
progressive effect for each policy except for the maternity bonus which has a neutral 
effect on inequality (203: 0%). One particularly interesting case is that of the ‘80 euro’ 
bonus once compared to REI: both measures positively affected income redistribution 
with the same value of 1.3%. It may be argued that an 11.7-billion-euro macroeconomic 
shock should lead to higher redistributive effects than an 1.1-billion-euro policy such 
as REI, even if it is intended for the poorest income groups. The difference in cost is 
remarkable, and the quantification of the effects may be interpreted as the incapacity 
of the ‘80 euro’ policy to achieve an adequate level of redistribution. The picture is 
then completed by the newborn bonus, the redistributive effect of which amounts to 
0.6%.   
So far the discussion has been centred on the contribution of tax-benefit instruments 
to the gross redistributive effect. In fact, O14 presents the characteristic of being an 
incomplete decomposition method focusing on vertical effects, which means that it does 
not provide a single value representing horizontal movements along the income 
distribution for each instrument analysed. The results of the application of D93 are 
therefore presented in the following (see Appendix). It is interesting to note the 
different magnitudes in the relative effect of net tax liabilities (# ) and income sources 
exempt from progressive taxation (%) when moving from Scenario 3 to 4. The 
reranking of households in Scenario 3 after subtracting the total amount of net taxes 
from gross income minus tax-free income sources (  –  01, following the notation in 
Section 2), has a positive effect on income inequality, but its magnitude varies 
substantially according to the tax-benefit system chosen (05# ,3: -5.1% → 18# ,3: -
4.8%). However, this equalising effect is not confirmed when including SICs for the 
2005 tax-benefit system, where net tax liabilities contribute to reducing income 
redistribution (05# ,4: 7.2%). The subsequent step consists of calculating the reranking 
of households after adding tax-free income sources to gross income after tax minus tax-
free income sources, resulting in disposable income,  −  . Results show that % 
plays an offsetting role, as it tends to be positive and always higher than #  except 
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for the 2005 tax-benefit system in Scenario 4, where it contributes to a lesser extent to 
the reduction of the net redistributive effect (
,: 4.9%).  
 
3.2 The relative contribution of tax-benefit instruments applying Urban 
(2014) 
 
To complete our investigation into the role of tax-benefit instruments in determining 
income redistribution, the results of the application of U14 will be discussed in this 
section (see Appendix for full results). The peculiarity of this simulation is twofold. 
First, the breakdown of RE was carried out taking account of SICs (Scenario 4). 
Second, the decomposition approach employed differs from O14 by calculating 
contributions to marginal changes in RE through small proportional increases in the 
overall value of taxes, benefits and pre-tax/benefit income for all units, thus making it 
possible to isolate not just vertical but also horizontal effects of taxes and benefits.  
The comparison of results among tax-benefit systems in Scenario 4 is given in Table 
3. The contribution of overall SICs amounts to 28.3% and 22.8% for the 2005 and 2018 
tax year respectively. This means that SICs contributed up to half of the amount 
resulting from progressive taxation in shaping redistribution, even if its influence 
decreased over the time period10. Much of the effect is achieved through employer 
contributions (10,05: 17.8% → 10,18: 15.1%), followed in order of magnitude by 
employee (11,05: 6.0% → 11,18: 5.9%) and self-employed contributions (12,05: 4.5% 
→ 12,18: 1.8%). The only significant difference over the period studied is therefore 
recorded for self-employed contributions. Despite the general increase in SICs, their 
aggregate value is lower by 3.6 billion euros in 2018 than in the base tax period (as is 
their incidence on total SICs) and no significant change was recorded in their 
concentration along the income distribution (12,05 : 0.50 → 12,18 : 0.53). It is also 
worth noting that the horizontal effects of employer and employee SICs are such as to 
halve their contributions to the net redistributive effect for both tax periods. 
The role of SICs in exercising an equalising effect on income redistribution can also 
be seen in Figure 3, where the percentage ratio of households where at least one member 
pays SICs by decile of gross equivalised household income is plotted. The incidence of 
SICs increasing with income is more evident for employer/employee contributions 
rather than self-employed contributions. Generally speaking, this ‘natural’ feature of 
proportional taxes levied on income sources highly concentrated on wealthy groups – 
such as capital income and gains and rental income from residential property – is 
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playing a role in sharpening the loss of vertical equity associated with the exclusion of 
these income components from progressive taxation as in the Italian context (Boscolo, 
2019). 
 
Table 4. Relative contribution of tax-benefit instruments in 






   
   
PIT (1) 55.4 50.2 
SICs: employer (10) 17.8 15.1 
SICs: employee (11) 6.0 5.9 
SICs: self-employed (12) 4.5 1.8 
Proportional taxes on capital income (3-8) 3.1 1.5 
Regional surtax (2) 1.3 2.0 
Proportional tax on rental income (9) - 2.0 
   
Social pension (8) 5.7 7.0 
Family allowances (9) 5.0 4.2 
Disability pension (10) 2.1 5.2 
Minimum Insertion Income (12) 0.2 0.2 
Housing benefits (11) 0.2 0.3 
Child benefit (13) 0.1 0.3 
Maternity payment (14) -0.1 0.3 
Scholarships and grants (15) -0.2 -0.3 
Non-taxable rental income (16) -1.1 0.0 
REI (17) - 1.9 
80 euro bonus (18) - 1.4 
Newborn bonus (19) - 0.8 
Maternity bonus (20) - 0.1 
   
   
Redistributive effect (RE) 100.0 100.0 
   
Note: values are ordered by increasing contributions of the 2005 tax period. 
 
The application of U14 leads to results in line with O14 in terms of sign, magnitude 
and dynamics over time of redistributive effects. Most of the instruments analysed are 
found to have small horizontal effects, leaving to vertical effects the determination of 
the net redistributive effect achieved. Disability pensions are the only tax-free cash 
benefits with significant horizontal effects: in the absence of other benefits, their effect 
on redistribution would be almost doubled (10,05: 2.1% → 10,18: 5.2%). Family 
20 
 
allowances and social pension are confirmed to be among the cash benefits with the 
highest contribution to the net redistributive effect (8,05: 5.7% → 8,05: 7.0%; 9,05: 
5.0% →9,05: 4.2%). This is followed by various cash benefits with minor effects such 
as maternity payments (14), child benefits (11), housing benefits (13) and the 
minimum insertion income (12), called Reddito minimo di inserimento, whose aim is 
to tackle poverty and social exclusion. The sum of the effects of these residual cash 
benefits amounts to 0.4% of RE in 2005 and reaches 1.1% in 2018. The ‘bonuses 
policy’ is quantified in 4.2% of RE, but unlike the previous applications, REI has an 
even greater progressive effect than the ‘80 euro’ bonus (17,05: 1.9%; 18,05: 1.4%). 
Withholding taxes on capital income are found to have a more limited progressive effect 
also when employing U14, equal to 3.1% and 1.5% for the 2005 and 2018 tax-benefit 
system respectively. The proportional tax on rental income from residential property 
presents a positive effect in line with the previous applications (9,05: 2.0%). To 
complete our analysis, scholarships and grants negatively determine redistribution for 
both tax periods (15,05: -0.2% → 15,18: -0.3%). 
 
Figure 3. Households with at least one member paying SICs by decile of gross equivalised 






















































This article provides initial evidence about the contribution of proportional taxes and 
tax-free cash benefits to income redistribution in Italy over the period 2005-2018. In 
order to answer the questions posed above, two alternative methods for decomposing 
the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system were adopted (Onrubia et al., 2014; 
Urban, 2014). The calculation of the effect of taxes and benefits was repeated for 
various scenarios which diverge from each other as they represent different degrees of 
extension of the tax-benefit system under examination. The main results of the study 
can be summarised as follows. The contribution of PIT components varied substantially 
over time. Marginal tax rates, deductions and tax credits determine PIT redistribution 
amounting to 42.4%, 55.0% and 4.2% respectively, while the 2005 tax period presented 
an opposite distribution of effects (18.7%, -1.1% and 83.7%). In a more comprehensive 
scenario, including gross income subject to proportional taxes and tax-free income 
sources such as cash benefits but excluding SICs, the contribution of PIT and regional 
surtax jointly considered to income redistribution amounts to 80.1% for the 2018 tax 
period when employing Onrubia et al. (2014) – O14 for simplicity. Moving on to the 
contribution of the remaining tax-benefit instruments, withholding taxes on capital 
income are found to have a small progressive effect on income redistribution ranging 
from 0.4% to 1.9% over the period 2005-2018. Social pension, family allowances and 
disability pensions are the tax-free cash benefits which contributed most to determining 
redistribution in 2018 (2005), amounting to 4.8%, 2.9% and 5.5% (3.3%, 2.9%, and 
2.0%) of the net redistributive effect respectively. To complete the picture in 2018, the 
flat tax levied on rental income from residential properties, the cedolare secca, made a 
contribution of 2.9% as calculated with O14, followed by the minimum income benefit 
in force until March 2019 – known as REI – with an effect of 1.3% and by the ‘80 euro’ 
bonus, also equal to 1.3%.          
Finally, to overcome the lack of compliance with the mutual exclusion property and 
to take account of SICs in the analysis, the empirical strategy proposed here is to turn 
our attention to the contribution of taxes and benefits to marginal changes in vertical 
and horizontal effects, that is the application of the methodology proposed by Urban 
(2014). With this approach, the contribution of progressive taxation in 2018 amounted 
to 52.2% (63.7%) when including (excluding) SICs. In other words, progressive taxation 
contributed to a lower extent to marginal changes in the net redistributive capacity of 
the tax-benefit system than its actual contribution to income redistribution as discussed 
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above. As far as proportional taxes and benefits are concerned, their contribution was 
found to be generally in line with the results of O14. It is worth mentioning that SICs 
had a strong positive effect on income redistribution amounting to 22.8% (28.3%) in 
2018 (2005), driven mainly by SICs paid on employment income with a contribution 











































RE decomposition applying O14 for the 2005 tax year (unit of analysis: equivalent household): full results 
    
TAX-BENEFIT INSTRUMENT 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
RE  % , RE  % , RE  % , 
          
          
Tax schedules (S) .0086 18.7 .5619 .0080 18.2 .5561 .0078 17.3 .5539 
          
          
PIT (1) .0097 21.1 .5685 .0088 20.0 .5634 .0086 19.1 .5610 
Regional surtax (2) -.0011 -2.4 .4317 -.0011 -2.5 .4280 -.0010 -2.2 .4251 
Arrears and severance pay (3)    .0003 0.7 .5635 .0003 0.7 .5618 
Other bonds (4)    .0001 0.2 .7119 .0001 0.2 .7119 
Dividends (5)    .0001 0.2 .7317 .0001 0.2 .7297 
Government bonds (6)    .0000 0.0 .6403 .0000 0.0 .6392 
Private pensions (7)    .0000 0.0 .8708 .0000 0.0 .8672 
Deposits (8)    -.0003 -0.7 .4317 -.0003 -0.7 .4333 
          
          
Tax credits (C) -.0005 -1.1 .3733 -.0004 -0.9 .3698 -.0005 -1.1 .3660 
          
          
Minimum limits for PIT (1) .0000 0.0 -.5789 .0000 0.0 -.5793 .0000 0.0 -.5731 
Mortgage interest payments (2) .0000 0.0 .3484 .0000 0.0 .3446 .0000 0.0 .3357 
Building and refurbishing costs (3) -.0001 -0.2 .3491 .0000 0.0 .3483 -.0001 -0.2 .3464 
Other expenses (4) -.0004 -0.9 .3880 -.0004 -0.9 .3838 -.0004 -0.9 .3807 
          
          
Deductions and exemptions (D) .0385 83.7 -.0351 .0370 84.1 -.0345 .0385 85.4 -.0416 
          
          
PIT: income source (1) .0307 66.7 -.0835 .0294 66.8 -.0826 .0277 61.4 -.0820 
PIT: dependent family members (2) .0086 18.7 -.2483 .0082 18.6 -.2412 .0078 17.3 -.2417 
PIT: main residence (3) .0004 0.9 .2421 .0004 0.9 .2408 .0004 0.9 .2383 
PIT: other expenses (4) .0000 0.0 .4220 .0000 0.0 .4183 .0000 0.0 .4159 
PIT: private pension contribution (5) -.0001 -0.2 .5786 -.0001 -0.2 .5739 -.0001 -0.2 .5692 
PIT: maintenance payments (6) -.0002 -0.4 .6108 -.0001 -0.2 .6108 -.0001 -0.2 .6031 
PIT: self-employed SICs (7) -.0009 -2.0 .4711 -.0007 -1.6 .4610 -.0008 -1.8 .4521 
Social pension (8)       .0015 3.3 -.6624 
Family allowances (9)       .0013 2.9 -.5073 
Disability pension (10)       .0009 2.0 .0533 
Housing benefits (11)       .0001 0.2 -.0836 
Minimum Insertion Income (12)       .0001 0.2 -.0142 
Child benefit (13)       .0000 0.0 -.6095 
Maternity payment (14)       .0000 0.0 .3154 
Scholarships and grants (15)       .0000 0.0 .3928 
Non-taxable rental income (16)       -.0002 -0.4 .6539 
          
          
Reranking (R) .0005 1.1  .0005 1.1  .0007 1.6  
          
          
Redistributive effect (RE) .0460 100.0  .0440 100.0  .0451 100.0  
          
          
Pre-tax Gini index (  ) .3673   .3725   .3594   
Post-tax Gini index (  −# ) .3214   .3285   .3143   
          
 










Reranking decomposition applying D13 
 
2005 tax-benefit system 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
RE % RE % RE % RE % 
         
         
Taxes (# ) .0005 1.1 .0005 1.1 -.0023 -5.1 .0045 7.2 
Benefits (%)     .0030 6.7 .0030 4.9 
         
         
Reranking (R) .0005 1.1 .0005 1.1 .0007 1.6 .0075 12.1 
     
     
2018 tax-benefit system 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
RE % RE % RE % RE % 
         
         
Taxes (# ) .0007 1.5 .0007 1.6 -.0048 -4.8 -.0019 -1.9 
Benefits (%)     .0058 5.8 .0103 10.3 
         
         
Reranking (R) .0007 1.5 .0007 1.6 .0010 2.1 .0084 8.4 




































RE decomposition applying O14 for the 2018 tax period (unit of analysis: equivalent household): full results 
    
TAX-BENEFIT INSTRUMENT 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
RE % , RE % , RE % , 
          
          
Tax schedules (S) .0204 42.4 .4743 .0183 41.0 .4683 .0173 36.4 .4652 
          
          
PIT (1) .0189 39.3 .4730 .0147 32.8 .4630 .0138 29.1 .4600 
Regional surtax (2) .0015 3.2 .4981 .0012 2.7 .4867 .0012 2.5 .4839 
Proportional tax on rental income (9)    .0015 3.4 .5709 .0014 2.9 .5640 
Arrears and severance pay (3)    .0010 2.3 .5445 .0010 2.1 .5447 
Private pensions (7)    .0000 0.0 .2268 .0000 0.0 .1918 
Government bonds (6)    .0000 0.0 .4377 .0000 0.0 .4334 
Dividends (5)    .0000 0.0 .4484 .0000 0.0 .4411 
Other bonds (4)    .0000 0.0 .4906 .0000 0.0 .4848 
Deposits (8)    -.0001 -0.2 .3342 -.0001 -0.2 .3322 
          
          
Tax credits (C) .0264 55.0 .0873 .0253 56.6 .0822 .0214 45.1 .0805 
          
          
Income source (5) .0195 40.5 .0488 .0185 41.4 .0459 .0158 33.3 .0461 
Dependent children (6) .0041 8.6 -.0552 .0039 8.8 -.0610 .0035 7.4 -.0641 
Dependent spouse (7) .0014 2.9 -.2126 .0013 2.9 -.2237 .0012 2.5 -.2349 
Rents (8) .0009 1.9 -.2697 .0008 1.8 -.2849 .0007 1.5 -.2893 
Other expenses (4) .0003 0.6 .4325 .0003 0.7 .4218 .0002 0.4 .4172 
Dependent parents (9) .0001 0.2 -.4364 .0001 0.2 -.4545 .0001 0.2 -.3895 
Mortgage interest payments (2) .0001 0.2 .3277 .0001 0.2 .3119 .0001 0.2 .3048 
Lone parents (10) .0000 0.0 -.4534 .0000 0.0 -.4999 .0000 0.0 -.5544 
Minimum limits for PIT (1) .0000 0.0 -.1602 .0000 0.0 -.1020 .0000 0.0 -.1220 
Education expenses (11) .0000 0.0 .2621 .0000 0.0 .2595 .0000 0.0 .2506 
Insurance premiums (12) .0000 0.0 .4684 .0000 0.0 .4589 .0000 0.0 .4528 
Building and refurbishing costs (3) .0001 0.2 .3802 .0002 0.5 .3722 -.0001 -0.2 .3672 
Health-related expenses (13) -.0001 -0.2 .4104 .0000 0.0 .3981 -.0001 -0.2 .3932 
          
          
Deductions and exemptions (D) .0020 4.2 .3192 .0018 4.1 .2973 .0098 20.6 -.0264 
          
          
PIT: main residence (3) .0019 4.0 .1191 .0017 3.8 .1265 .0016 3.4 .1221 
PIT: self-employed SICs (7) .0002 0.4 .3993 .0002 0.5 .3975 .0001 0.2 .3774 
PIT: other expenses (4) .0000 0.0 .4110 .0000 0.0 .4021 .0000 0.0 .4009 
PIT: maintenance payments (6) .0000 0.0 .4648 .0000 0.0 .4654 .0000 0.0 .4511 
PIT: private pension contribution (5) -.0001 -0.2 .4453 .0000 0.0 .4303 -.0001 -0.2 .4291 
Disability pensions (10)       .0026 5.5 .0295 
Social pension (8)       .0023 4.8 -.6162 
Family allowances (9)       .0014 2.9 -.3436 
REI (17)       .0006 1.3 -.9148 
80 euro bonus (18)       .0006 1.3 .1619 
Newborn bonus (19)       .0003 0.6 -.3536 
Child benefits (13)       .0001 0.2 -.5230 
Maternity payments (14)       .0001 0.2 -.2842 
Minimum Insertion Income (12)       .0001 0.2 -.2794 
Housing benefits (11)       .0001 0.2 -.2238 
Mother bonus (20)       .0000 0.0 .0100 
Non-taxable rental income (16)       .0000 0.0 .4255 
Scholarships and grants (15)       .0000 0.0 .4390 
          
          
Reranking (R) .0007 1.5  .0007 1.6  .0010 2.1  
          
          
Redistributive effect (RE) .0481 100.0  .0447 100.0  .0475 100.0  
          
          
Pre-tax Gini index (  ) .4141   .4135   .3875   
Post-tax Gini index (  −# ) .3661   .3689   .3401   
          





Relative contributions of taxes and benefits applying U14 for the 2005 tax period (unit of analysis: equivalent household): full results 
             
TAX-BENEFIT INSTRUMENT 
 Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
H  % V  % T % H  % V  % T  % 
             
             
PIT (1) -.0028 31.8 -.0535 71.6 -.0508 77.2 .0022 6.5 .0529 42.2 .0508 55.4 
Arrears and severance pay (3) -.0000 0.0 -.0021 2.8 -.0021 3.2 .0001 0.3 .0022 1.8 .0021 2.3 
Regional surtax (2) -.0001 1.1 -.0013 1.7 -.0012 1.8 .0001 0.3 .0013 1.0 .0012 1.3 
Deposits (8) .0000 0.0 -.0004 0.5 -.0004 0.6 -.0001 -0.3 .0003 0.2 .0004 0.4 
Other bonds (4) .0000 0.0 -.0002 0.3 -.0002 0.3 .0000 0.0 .0002 0.2 .0002 0.2 
Dividends (5) .0000 0.0 -.0001 0.1 -.0001 0.2 .0000 0.0 .0001 0.1 .0001 0.1 
Government bonds (6) .0000 0.0 -.0001 0.1 -.0001 0.2 .0000 0.0 .0001 0.1 .0001 0.1 
Private pensions (7) .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 
SICs: employer (10)       .0196 57.8 .0358 28.5 .0163 17.8 
SICs: employee (11)       .0059 17.4 .0114 9.1 .0055 6.0 
SICs: self-employed (12)       -.0004 -1.2 .0037 3.0 .0041 4.5 
             
Social pension (8) -.0007 8.0 -.0059 7.9 -.0052 7.9 .0007 2.1 .0059 4.7 .0052 5.7 
Family allowances (9) -.0002 2.3 -.0048 6.4 -.0046 7.0 -.0004 -1.2 .0042 3.3 .0046 5.0 
Disability pension (10) -.0039 44.3 -.0058 7.8 -.0019 2.9 .0049 14.5 .0067 5.3 .0019 2.1 
Minimum Insertion Income (12) -.0004 4.5 -.0006 0.8 -.0002 0.3 .0004 1.2 .0006 0.5 .0002 0.2 
Housing benefits (11) -.0001 1.1 -.0004 0.5 -.0002 0.3 .0001 0.3 .0003 0.2 .0002 0.2 
Child benefit (13) -.0000 0.0 -.0001 0.1 -.0001 0.2 .0000 0.0 .0001 0.1 .0001 0.1 
Maternity payment (14) -.0001 1.1 -.0001 0.2 .0001 -0.1 .0002 0.6 .0001 0.1 -.0001 -0.1 
Scholarships and grants (15) -.0004 4.5 -.0002 0.3 .0002 -0.3 .0004 1.2 .0002 0.2 -.0002 -0.2 
Non-taxable rental income (16) -.0001 1.1 .0009 -1.2 .0010 -1.5 .0003 0.9 -.0007 -0.6 -.0010 -1.1 
             
             
Total effect (E) -.0088 100.0 -.0747 100.0 -.0658 100.0 -.0339 100.0 -.1254 100.0 -.0917 100.0 
             




Relative contributions of taxes and benefits applying U14 for the 2018 tax period (unit of analysis: equivalent household): full results 
 
TAX-BENEFIT INSTRUMENT 
Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
H  % V  % T  % H % V % T % 
             
             
PIT (1) -.0045 28.5 -.0566 59.0 -.0521 65.1 -.0045 10.5 -.0566 38.6 -.0521 50.2 
Proportional tax on rental income (9) .0000 0.0 -.0021 2.2 -.0021 2.6 .0006 -1.4 -.0015 1.0 -.0021 2.0 
Regional surtax (2) -.0003 1.9 -.0024 2.5 -.0021 2.6 -.0003 0.7 -.0024 1.6 -.0021 2.0 
Arrears and severance pay (3) .0000 0.0 -.0015 1.6 -.0015 1.9 .0000 0.0 -.0015 1.0 -.0015 1.4 
Dividends (5) .0000 0.0 -.0001 0.1 -.0001 0.1 .0000 0.0 -.0001 0.1 -.0001 0.1 
Government bonds (6) .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 
Other bonds (4) .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 
Private pensions (7) .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 
Deposits (8) .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 
SICs: employer (10)       -.0205 47.9 -.0362 24.7 -.0157 15.1 
SICs: employee (11)       -.0070 16.4 -.0131 8.9 -.0061 5.9 
SICs: self-employed (12)       -.0005 1.2 -.0024 1.6 -.0019 1.8 
             
Social pension (8) -.0013 8.2 -.0086 9.0 -.0073 9.1 -.0013 3.0 -.0086 5.9 -.0073 7.0 
Disability pensions (10) -.0083 52.5 -.0136 14.2 -.0054 6.8 -.0099 23.1 -.0153 10.4 -.0054 5.2 
Family allowances (9) -.0001 0.6 -.0046 4.8 -.0044 5.5 .0005 -1.2 -.0040 2.7 -.0044 4.2 
REI (17) .0000 0.0 -.0020 2.1 -.0020 2.5 .0000 0.0 -.0020 1.4 -.0020 1.9 
80 euro bonus (18) -.0002 1.3 -.0016 1.7 -.0014 1.8 .0008 -1.9 -.0006 0.4 -.0014 1.4 
Newborn bonus (19) -.0001 0.6 -.0008 0.8 -.0008 1.0 .0001 -0.2 -.0007 0.5 -.0008 0.8 
Child benefits (13) .0000 0.0 -.0003 0.3 -.0003 0.4 .0000 0.0 -.0003 0.2 -.0003 0.3 
Housing benefits (11) -.0002 1.3 -.0005 0.5 -.0003 0.4 -.0001 0.2 -.0005 0.3 -.0003 0.3 
Maternity payments (14) .0000 0.0 -.0003 0.3 -.0003 0.4 .0000 0.0 -.0002 0.1 -.0003 0.3 
Minimum Insertion Income (12) -.0001 0.6 -.0003 0.3 -.0002 0.3 -.0001 0.2 -.0003 0.2 -.0002 0.2 
Mother bonus (20) .0000 0.0 -.0002 0.2 -.0001 0.1 .0000 0.0 -.0001 0.1 -.0001 0.1 
Non-taxable rental income (16) .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 .0000 0.0 
Scholarships and grants (15) -.0006 3.8 -.0003 0.3 .0003 -0.4 -.0005 1.2 -.0002 0.1 .0003 -0.3 
             
             
Total effect (E) -.0158 100.0 -.0959 100.0 -.0800 100.0 -.0428 100.0 -.1465 100.0 -.1037 100.0 
             
 





1.  In the case of Italy, the most up-to-date non-behavioural models and their primary 
characteristics are as follows: SM2 (Betti et al., 2011), whose peculiar trait is the 
employment of its net-to-gross algorithm in order to obtain IT-SILC’s gross income variables 
(Istat, 2011); BETAMOD (Albarea et al., 2015), known for its accuracy in estimating 
individual tax evasion rates; Di Nicola et al. (2015), the static model of the Italian 
Department of Finance based on an exact match between sample survey data and individual 
tax returns; TREMOD (Azzolini et al., 2017), one of the few examples in the Italian context 
of regional microsimulation modelling; BIMic (Curci et al., 2017), the Bank of Italy’s model 
whose estimations of immovable and movable property values are generally more precise 
than other models employing non-administrative data; MicroReg (Maitino et al., 2017), 
focused on indirect taxes and in-kind transfers; finally, MAPP© (Baldini et al., 2015a; 
Boscolo, 2019), whose strength relies above all on the simulation of in-cash and in-kind 
transfers as well as proportional taxes and income sources exempt from progressive taxation. 
2. Italian politics is particularly dynamic. At the time of writing, the ruling coalition made up 
by the Five Star Movement and the League fell apart, along with the proposal for a flat tax 
scheme on personal income.  
3. Unlike the approach just discussed, the so-called natural decomposition rule as defined in 
Kristjánsson (2013) computes the effect of each tax-benefit instrument on their 
corresponding tax bases. This opposite method has been introduced as a technique for 
analysing the redistributive effect of a dual income tax system, where labour income is 
subject to progressive marginal tax rates, and capital income to alternative proportional tax 
regimes. 
4. The sum of changes in post-tax/benefit Gini indices in response to proportional increases 
(7) in pre-tax/benefit income   –  01, taxes (T) and benefits (Ben), is equal to zero, 
precisely[  −#( −%)(1−U) −   −# ] + [  −##(1−U) −   −# ] + [  −#%(1−U) −   −# ] = 0. Mention 
should be made of the fact that the magnitude of the proportional increase does not affect 
the calculation of single contributions.  
5. To simplify matters, in the following we will often make use of a restricted notation. A first 
superscript containing the term A indicates the i-th scenario to which each redistributive 
index refers. A further superscript precedes the latter when differentianting for 
decomposition approach. To indicate the tax-benefit system under examination, a subscript 
equal to ‘05’ or ‘18’ is added, which is in turn preceded by a numerical subscript when 
referring to specific tax-benefit instruments. This is not applied to concentration indices, 
where the superscript stands for the tax period chosen and the subscript is made up of two 
terms, the first indicating the variable whose concentration index is calculated, while the 
second represents the variable used for ordering households. 
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6. PIT brackets and tax rates in 2005 (values in euros): 1) up to 26,000: 23%; 2) 26,001-33,500: 
33%; 3) 33,501-100,000: 39%; 4) over 100,000: 43%. PIT brackets and tax rates in 2018 
(values in euros): 1) up to 15,000: 23%; 2) 15,001-28,000: 27%; 3) 28,001-55,000: 38%; 4) 
55,001-75,000: 41%; 5) over 75,000: 43%. 
7. Several regions have modulated additional tax rates and introduced exemptions in such a 
way as to achieve progressivity over the period 2005-2018. Just five regions out of twenty-
one applied graduated tax rates in 2005, a number that increased to 12 in 2018. 
8. https://www1.finanze.gov.it/finanze3/pagina_dichiarazioni/dichiarazioni.php: statistics on 
tax returns released by the Italian Department of Finance – MEF. 
9. The following non-taxable income components are included within the category of disability 
pensions: Civil Infirmity Allowance (Prestazione di invalidità civile); Monthly Assistance 
Allowance (Assegno mensile di assistenza); Carer’s Allowance (Indennità di 
accompagnamento); Frequency Benefit (Indennità di frequenza); Visual Impairment Pension 
(Pensione di cecità); Special Benefit (Indennità speciale); Deaf-Dumb Pension (Pensione ai 
sordomuti); Communication Benefit (Indennità di comunicazione); Personal Long-term 
Assistance Allowance (Assegno per assistenza personale continuativa). 
10. Despite being commonly defined as a tax credit, this measure is not embedded within the 
structure of PIT and so it is considered here. The contribution to the overall redistributive 
effect was computed considering the bonus as an income source exempt from taxation for 
all decomposition approaches employed. 
11. The measure has recently been replaced by Reddito di Cittadinanza (RdC), an enhanced 
minimum income scheme in effect since March 2019; the difference between the two benefits 
consists in a more generous sum granted by the new scheme in place, which is still 
conditional on the willingness of the individual to make the transition to employment, and 
in compliance with further patrimonial requirements. For a detailed examination of the 
measures, see Monticelli (2019).  
12. The proportion of SIC contributions to progressive taxation considered as a whole is equal 
to 49.9% and 56.0% for the 2005 and 2018 tax-benefit system respectively. It should be 
noted that SICs amounted to 214 billion euros in 2005,1.63 times higher than PIT and 
regional surtax jointly considered. As far as the 2018 year is concerned, taking the 2016 
administrative data (the most recent available), SICs amounted to 228.4 billion euros with 
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